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1966/08/01

THE WHITE HOUSE



August 1, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 355

TO:

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further

to NSAM 351

The President has approved the recommendations contained in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the President of July 25, 1966, concerning the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, as requested in NSAM 351. These recommendations are attached.

He asks that the Secretary of State assume responsibility for implementing these recommendations. Where appropriate, the Secretary may, in consultation with other agencies, delegate to these agencies responsibility for implementing specific recommendations.

Within one month, I would appreciate it if the Department of State could report to this office the assignment of operational responsibility for the specific tasks called for by these recommendations. By November 1 we would hope for the first progress report on implementation.

W. W. Rostow

Distribution:

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REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO NSAM NO. 351: THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

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REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO NSAM NO. 351: THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Economic Pressures and Inducements

- 1. We should continue indirect pressures designed:
 (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan.
- 2. In support of the foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical, and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary.
- 3. We should avoid direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pronuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program.
- 4. If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's "no bomb" policy an implicit part of the deal.



B. Security Aspects

- 1. We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned.
- 2. In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat.
- 3. We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft.
- 4. When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies should now be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which we might be called upon to prevent the Chinese from using "nuclear blackmail" in that part of the world, a policy enunciated in connection with the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device; (b) how we would be likely to react in the event that Communist China were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack against India; (c) what tangible steps might eventually need to be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance; and (d) what further steps in the security field might need to be considered if it should become apparent that India, nevertheless, was determined to have a nuclear role.

C. Arms Control Measures

While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should

continue






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continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear.

D. Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries

- 1. Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear
 powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt
 this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward
 proposals based on the assumption that the five nuclear
 countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common
 some special interest not shared by others.
- 2. Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to "military nuclear powers" (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between "nuclear and non-nuclear powers."
- 3. We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters.
- 4. We should emphasize the relevance of economic strength to political influence.
- 5. We should bear in mind that, if the U.K., as a former colonial power, were to phase out of national nuclear deterrence, the impact on India's thinking about nuclear weapons would be highly significant.

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6. A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige.

E. Intelligence Requirements

In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data.

F. Contingency Planning

A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program.





II. THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

A. Background


NSAM No. 351 requested a report and recommendations concerning the following interrelated issues emerging from the National Security Council review of June 9, 1966, concerning the Indian nuclear weapons problem:

- -- The extent to which it might be in the U.S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.
- -- The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U.S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.
- -- How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.
- -- Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

B. Basic Considerations

- 1. In examining specific actions bearing on the Indian nuclear weapons problem, four basic considerations need to be recognized.
 - a. The source of the problem is basically two-fold:
 - -- The problem arises in part from political and prestige concerns to which a nuclear capability may be pertinent. These concerns relate importantly

to India's





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
to India's future position vis-a-vis Communist China in Asia, and to whether an effort to "go it alone" militarily (including nuclear as well) will come to be regarded as essential to exerting independent political influence.

-- The problem also stems in part from security concerns--the need to deter or to counter future Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail or attack.

The situation is complicated by public pressures generated by those who neither fully understand nor cooly weight political and security considerations. Because the problem has more than a single root, no single action we might take can be expected to provide a full answer.

- b. Both political and security aspects will change over time. Political and prestige concerns are already much in evidence and will be sharpened by any move that appears to enhance Communist China's status as a result of its entry into the "nuclear club". Security concerns will continue to mount as Communist China's nuclear weapons program proceeds. Because we are confronted with a moving rather than a fixed target, steps we might take in the short-term will not necessarily add up to a long-term solution.
- c. We cannot accurately predict when the issue may come to a head. We do not believe a decision is "imminent" in the sense of confronting us this week or this month. Nor do we now expect that a decision to go nuclear will be made this year--although conditions could change rapidly if further Communist Chinese tests should arouse even stronger Indian anxieties. However, we cannot gauge the need for action solely in terms of the periodic rise and fall of Indian public sentiment. Consequently, we will

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need to keep under continuing review both what can usefully be done at any particular time, and also what might be done if and as the issue appears to be reaching an acute stage.

- d. Too much direct and pointed U.S. pressure in the short-term could lead to the growth of a "go it alone" philosophy in India for the long term. Although our ability to influence India's decision is limited, we do hold some important cards; but our effectiveness will depend not only on these cards but also on how we play our hand. India's leaders continue to hew to a policy of foregoing a national nuclear weapons capability. At least for the present, our stance should be that of supporting an existing Indian policy which serves India's interests, rather than one of questioning the sincerity of that policy and of preparing to battle possible change. Unless a basis of mutual confidence and respect can be constructed, there will be virtually no chance of averting an eventual pro-nuclear decision.
- 2. If these considerations suggest the difficulties of finding "permanent solutions", the fact remains that an Indian nuclear decision would adversely affect our own interests:
 - -- By imposing an increasing burden on India's economy, thereby jeopardizing the development of the economic base required for future political stability;
 - -- By stimulating Pakistan's fears, encouraging the Paks to seek nuclear weapons of their own, and opening further opportunities for Communist China to seek to pose as Pakistan's "protector";

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- -- By aggravating the nuclear weapons issue in Japan, since an Indian nuclear weapons program would directly confront the Japanese with the question of how best to ensure their own future political position; and
- -- By indirectly encouraging proliferation elsewhere to the extent that existing inhibitions would be further reduced.
- 3. It can be argued that a successful Indian nuclear weapons program might relieve us of future military burdens we might be called upon to bear if India refrains from "going nuclear". Nevertheless, we believe adverse effects such as those identified above outweigh this consideration. Moreover, certain of these adverse effects of an Indian pro-nuclear decision would be felt immediately. Continued Indian restraint would provide further time for developing long-term approaches, for permitting more favorable evolution in India-Pak relations and perhaps within Communist China, and for taking steps which might ease the impact of an Indian decision if our efforts to prevent it should not prove successful.
- 4. Accordingly, even if we cannot now describe a permanent solution", delaying actions will be useful. Because we cannot be sure over the long-term of effecting more than a delay, we will want to bear in mind the need to protect our continuing interests in India even in the event it should eventually go nuclear, and to study what our reactions should be in this contingency.


C. Course of Action

1. Economic Pressures and Inducements

a. <u>Discussion</u>

We are currently using our economic aid leverage with India to insist on major internal economic reforms which

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are moving the country much closer to economic policies advocated by the U.S. than the Indians have heretofore been prepared to go. India's leaders have recognized that these reforms are in their country's interest, and they have taken courageous and publicly unpopular steps to introduce them. If these steps are to pay off, India will need to concentrate its resources on development. This creates pressures against going nuclear.

Although we have not directly insisted that India remain non-nuclear as part of the bargain, we have made clear that our willingness to follow through is contingent not only on continued peace with Pakistan, but on limitation of India's (and Pakistan's) defense expenditures. This adds to pressures on India to forego—or at least delay—a nuclear weapons effort.

It seems clear that economic considerations loom large in the present decision of India's leaders against going nuclear. However, we believe they have submitted to about as much direct economic pressure from us as the political situation within the country will tolerate at this time. Under existing circumstances, a direct warning that we would have to cut back (or even eliminate) our economic aid would be received by India's leaders as a challenge to their sincerity, an inducement to demonstrate their independence, and a spur toward a policy of "going it alone" while perforce relying more on the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, depending on the circumstances existing at the time, we might be able to prolong India's non-nuclear weapons policy by levying an implied no-bomb requirement if, in another year or two, India's leaders would come to us seeking increased aid levels on the grounds that increases were warranted in the light of economic performance. If this were indeed the case and if we were prepared to respond, continuation of India's ho bomb" policy might be made an implicit

part of





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part of the deal. This would not be construed as an attempt to "buy off" the Indians since the determining considerations would clearly be economic performance and promise.


The success of indirect economic pressures and the usefulness of economic inducements will depend, in part, on whether we can convince Indian leaders—both within and outside the government—that a nuclear weapons program would in fact represent an increasing burden, not only in terms of the financial strains it would impose (including demands on foreign exchange) but also in terms of the drain on scientific, technical, and managerial talent which might be increasingly diverted from the priority task of economic development.

It should be recognized that a "demonstration" weapons test or "token" capability would not be costly. On the other hand, achievement of a useful capability would not only mean development and production of warheads, but also development (or procurement if feasible) of relatively long-range delivery vehicles, of communications systems, and of warning systems. Moreover, the experience of all countries which have entered the nuclear weapons field shows that major continuing effort is required to keep all these elements of an effective capability up to date. There is no reason to suppose that India's experience would prove to be different.

Such points need to be gotten across to a broad spectrum of governmental officials and non-governmental opinion leaders. If this can be done, there will be a better chance of convincing India to stick with economic development as the most promising route to a strong international political position, and the best ground on which to challenge Communist China.

 Recommendations Respecting Economic Pressures and Inducements.

(1) We







- (1) We should continue indirect pressures designed: (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan.
- (2) In support of the foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary.
- (3) We should avoid volunteering direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program.
- (4) If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's "no bomb" policy an implicit part of the deal.










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2. Security Aspects

(a) Discussion

The Communist Chinese political and military threat to India is real.


The military threat today is, of course, conventional, and for the present, India's military as well as political leaders are giving priority to conventional defense.

The nuclear "threat" will be low at least for several years, and even when Communist China achieves a militarily significant nuclear capability, there will be political inhibitions against using it as well as the military risks such an action might entail.

Nonetheless, against the background of past Sino-Indian conflict, and given the leadtime problems involved in all defense efforts, pressures in India to meet the potential ChiCom nuclear threat will mount. These pressures will be larger to the extent that the Indians form an exaggerated impression of Communist China's nuclear progress. Since public attention is claimed by each ChiCom nuclear test, such an impression of progress tends to emerge regardless of hurdles that remain to be overcome before Communist China can actually achieve and deploy a capability that might be effectively directed against India.

Although U.S. information and estimates on Communist China's nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle program are by no means as complete as we would like, they are undoubtedly better than India's. We should use them privately vis-a-vis the Indians to encourage a more objective view which, without falsely discounting such progress as Communist China is making, would take into account remaining difficulties and

limitations





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limitations. Moreover, we should seek to keep the problem in perspective by helping Indian opinion leaders to develop an increasingly clear understanding of strategic problems.

Such U.S. efforts will, however, fail if our own public statements exaggerate the ChiCom nuclear threat. For example, public discussion of the view that we should ourselves deploy anti-ballistic missiles as a defense against Communist China can have the effect of magnifying and "accelerating" the emergence of the ChiCom nuclear threat in India's eyes.

The fact remains that Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities will increase. So long as India refrains from seeking nuclear weapons of its own, the Indians will, whether publicly admitting it or not, count on us to deter ChiCom nuclear aggression. During the period when the threat will be negligible or low, such implicit reliance should not present an unacceptable burden for either country.

Over the longer-term, more concrete arrangements would be needed if some degree of continuing reliance on the U.S. is to provide an alternative to an Indian national nuclear capability. It may be possible--but it will not be easy--to work out a mutually acceptable balancing of the political and military interests of the two countries, including India's interests in pursuing politically independent policies while maintaining good relations with the U.S. and Soviet Union, and our own interest in limiting our commitments.


The short-term problem would be eased by adoption of our 1965 draft resolution, which would express the intention of UN members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

Although the necessarily vague and generalized language of such a resolution would probably not provide sufficient

assurance

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assurance from India's standpoint, a resolution of this character could provide an "umbrella" under which private security assurances might more easily be offered by the U.S., and also by the Soviet Union if and when it may be prepared to take that step. Within limits, the resolution could also provide a framework facilitating steps to bolster private assurances over the longer-term.

However, the Soviet Union has not shown any interest to date either in offering private security assurances to India or in joining us in a multilateral assurance along the lines of our draft UN resolution.

We should make a further effort to interest the Soviets in supporting such a resolution. It should be noted, however, that the prospect of winning Soviet support is not good, partly because they have been pushing their own approach—a pledge by nuclear countries not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. This Soviet proposal, which seems designed specifically to try to undercut U.S. nuclear deployments abroad, is likely to be popular in the UN.

In order to capitalize on the U.S. draft resolution, if it can be achieved, we should be prepared to consider promptly at that time approaching India's leaders with a private security assurance. This is because although a UN resolution along the lines we have drafted should have a useful impact on public opinion in India, India's leaders would be well aware of its practical deficiencies. Accordingly, the resolution would not substitute for private security assurances.


In the more likely event that the Soviet Union continues not to support a useful UN resolution, we will still need to consider offering a private security assurance, and to do

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


so before pro-nuclear trends in India pass the point of no return. For in the absence of a UN resolution, India's leaders might have a more difficult task in coping with public concerns about security. However, even then the task of holding public pressures in check might not be impossible, and a private security assurance on which India's leaders felt they could rely would give them more incentive and justification for vigorously addressing the task.

In either of the foregoing circumstances (that is, under the "umbrella" of a UN resolution or without such a resolution if it cannot be achieved) a private U.S. security assurance of the type envisaged here would involve going beyond our general offer of October, 1964, to support non-nuclear countries threatened by nuclear blackmail. In defining its terms, the following factors should be taken into account.

- (1) The objective would be to discourage ChiCom nuclear blackmail efforts and deter ChiCom nuclear aggression.
- (2) The assurance would apply only to cases where Communist China threatened or initiated nuclear aggression.
- (3) The deterrent to such threats or aggression would not rest on a unilateral public commitment (which we would not want to give a non-ally, and which a non-aligned India would not want), but on evident U.S. interest in India and evident U.S. opposition to ChiCom aggression.
- (4) In the event of actual nuclear attack, our response would be measured; possible responses would include selective retaliation (presumably nuclear retaliation) focussed on ChiCom nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities.





(5)

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(5) In the event of ChiCom conventional attack only, we would, of course, stand by our 1963 commitment to consult with India on air defense.

Such an arrangement would entail possible involvement in a nuclear conflict under unforeseeable and perhaps ambiguous circumstances. This risk will be low during the period when Communist China's nuclear capabilities are limited. However, as Communist China's capabilities grow, the possible risks would be more significant from India's standpoint and our own. Unless such an assurance were bolstered by tangible steps to increase its credibility, it would probably not be effective in delaying an Indian pronuclear decision for as long as, say, five years.

If the U.S. should decide to offer a private security assurance, an effort might be made to encourage the Soviet Union to follow a similar course.


We are not at this time recommending approval of the type of private assurance discussed here. A decision need not be considered until the outcome of further efforts to secure a UN resolution has become more clear; the question will need to be reviewed in the light of circumstances existing at that time. In order to be prepared to consider the matter on a timely basis then, three aspects of the problem should now receive further, detailed analysis:

-- How we would be likely to react if, in fact, the Communist Chinese should mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India: What political and military considerations would be involved; how these might change depending on the circumstances; what risks would be entailed in supporting India or in standing by.

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


- What steps might eventually be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance, if one were offered and proved of interest to the Indians.
- What further steps in the security field might still need to be considered if it should become apparent that India was, nevertheless, determined to have a nuclear role.

b. Recommendations Respecting Security Aspects.

- (1) We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned.
- (2) In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat.
- (3) We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft.
- (4) When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies now should be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which

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3. Arms Control Measures.


a. Discussion

Within the U.S. Government, the following approaches, listed here in order of the stage of consideration they have reached, are being reviewed:

- A threshold test ban. This proposal has been considered by the Committee of Principals, and arguments for and against are being forwarded. (Pending the outcome of consideration of a threshold test ban, no specific action is now being proposed on a comprehensive test ban.)
- Non-proliferation agreement. A revised draft is under consideration by the Committee of Principals.
- Non-use of nuclear weapons. ACDA has suggested consideration (in the context of a non-proliferation agreement) of a prohibition against using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country except in defense against an act of aggression in which a state owning nuclear weapons is engaged.

At present





At present, there is little prospect of U.S.-Soviet agreement on a non-proliferation agreement or extension of the test ban, unless a marked change should be made in the position of one country or the other.

From the standpoint of the Indian nuclear weapons problem the potential significance of an extension of the nuclear test ban and achievement of a non-proliferation agreement would vary considerably.

Either would help buy time. This is true in part because of the political (and to a lesser extent technical) inhibitions that such agreements would create. In India's case, an additional factor would be India's view that, as a general matter, its own interests are served by any steps which seem to bring the U.S. and Soviet Union closer together and which, conversely, deepen the Sino-Soviet split. Further arms control agreements would serve this function.


However, with respect to a non-proliferation agreement, Indian spokesmen have expressed the following views (also expressed by spokesmen of several other "nuclear capable" countries): (i) that a "have" versus "have not" issue is involved, and (ii) that there should be a balance of "sacrifices" military nuclear and civil nuclear countries are called upon to make. An extension of the nuclear test ban would come closer than a non-proliferation agreement to meeting these views and would, in India's view, have the added attraction of implying international criticism of continued nuclear testing by Communist China. Against the background of public debate on the nuclear issue in India, an extension of the test ban would, for these reasons, give India's leaders a stronger position domestically than a non-proliferation agreement.

If the U.S. and Soviet Union should agree on either proposal, India would feel under pressure to adhere. However, both agreements will have escape clauses, and it should be


recognized







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recognized that continuing Indian adherence would depend in large measure on subsequent events.

b. Recommendation Respecting Arms Control Measures

While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear.

4. Other Factors: Political Status and Prestige.

a. Discussion

Given the high political content of India's interest in nuclear weapons, we should: (i) seek to avoid aggravating the "have" versus "have not" aspects of the issue, particularly as regards India's status vis-a-vis that of Communist China, (ii) see whether any specific steps can be taken to bolster the political status and prestige of India (and of other countries which have achieved advanced nuclear capabilities but have not sought nuclear weapons).

b. Recommendations Respecting Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries.

(1) Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward proposals based on the assumption that the five countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common some special interest not shared by others.







- (2) Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to "military nuclear powers" (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between "nuclear and non-nuclear powers."
- (3) We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters.
- (4) We should emphasize the relevance of economic strength to meaningful political influence.
- (5) We should bear in mind that, if the U.K., as a former colonial power, were to phase out of national nuclear deterrence, the impact on India's thinking about nuclear weapons would be highly significant.
- (6) A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige.

D. <u>Special Recommendation Respecting Intelligence</u> Requirements.

In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data.



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E. Special Recommendation Regarding Contingency Planning.

A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program.